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ABSTRACT 
As long as the commercial fishery has existed in Newfoundland and Labrador there 
has also existed a relationship of mistrust between fishermen and processor. The 
existence of this tense relationship is often observed most easily in the price 
determination system used to settle prices paid for fish in this province. While not the 
cause of some of the problems in the fishing industry today. price determination could 
never be seen as a method of solving the problems that do exist because it usually 
pitted harvester against processor. While many problems exist in the industry, one in 
particular seems to have gone unchecked for years, that is inconsistent quality of 
Newfoundland and Labrador seafood. Can one establish a relationship between 
quality and price determination that would see higher prices paid for better quality. 
This paper will focus on using auctions as a method of improving harvester processor 
relations as well as improving quality in the industry. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to study the ability offish auctions to provide an 
alternative form of price determination for the Newfoundland and Labrador fishing 
industry. There are four issues that are of particular importance to this research. First 
of all, will there be a benefit to the Newfoundland and Ladrador fishery if a fish 
auction is instituted here? Second, how will an auction impact the quality of fish 
landed and processed in this province? Third. is there enough competition in the 
industry to operate an auction? Finally. what challenges can one expect when 
instituting an auction in this province? These issues are very important when 
discussing an auction for this province and one must consider the expected outcome 
prior to initiating an auction in Newfoundland and Labrador. 
It will focus on the Icelandic fish auctions as a potential model that could be used 
here. The Icelandic auction system was chosen due to the similarities between 
Iceland and NewfoundlandlLabrador. Iceland is an island nation with heavy 
dependence on the fishing industry as it has very limited natural resources to exploit 
other than hydro electric and geothermal power. The waters surrounding Iceland are 
rich in marine resources. Iceland instituted a fish auction in order to provide 
harvesters and processors with a method of settling prices with which both could be 
satisfied. Newfoundland and Labrador has a similar situation. Like Iceland, its 
economy has historically relied heavily on the fishing industry. The Grand Banks lie 
off the Southeast coast and are among the richest fishing grounds in the world, as are 
the fishing grounds surrounding ofIceland. Also, price determination in the industry 
has been a source of conflict between harvesters and processors in the fishing 
industries of Iceland and Newfoundland and Labrador. 
The infonnation for this paper was gathered through three methods, published reports, 
interviews with industry representatives. and website searches. Interviews were 
conducted with representatives from the Fishennan Food and Allied Workers Union 
(FFAW), Fisheries Association of Newfoundland and Labrador (FANL), and Fishery 
Products International (FPI). Most of the infonnation on Iceland was taken from 
other published reports and websites. One important note is the fact that the Fisheries 
Association of Newfoundland and Labrador has been disbanded since the infonnation 
for this paper was gathered. 
The paper will be divided into six sections. The first section is the introduction 
which explains why the study was conducted, the method used to gather data and an 
overview of the structure of the paper. The second section will examine the basic 
organization of fish auctions and how they work. The third section will examine the 
Icelandic experience with fish auctions. The fourth section will describe the present 
situation in Newfoundland and Labrador and how auctions may influence issues in the 
industry. The fifth section will draw on the infonnation that was gathered here to 
fonn a clear picture of how an auction will affect the four questions stated earlier in 
the introduction and to provide recommendations for the fishing industry pertaining to 
auctions. The final section will be the conclusion and will provide a summation of the 
findings. 
The relevance of this research became even clearer on February 2, 2004 as the 
Provincial Minister of Fisheries announced his plans to implement a hail at sea fish 
auction for the 2004 shrimp fishery (www.gov.nf.ca. 02125/2004). Since that point in 
time the industry has fluctuated on whether or not to have an auction. The auction 
was slated to begin working early in June but harvesters and processors were able to 
reach an agreement on prices for this season. However, the auction wi1l be examined 
this fall and remains a possibility for shrimp next year as well as for other speeies. 
The shrimp industry in Newfoundland and Labrador is one of the most troubled, with 
inconsistent quality and low prices. This will certainly be a challenge for the 
introduction of an auction. 
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2. Fish Auctions 
The dictionary defines an auction as a public sale conducted by bidding, at which the 
highest bidder becomes the purchaser (Funk & Wagnells Standard Dictionary, 1993). 
Therefore, a fish auction can be described as the public sale of fish through a bidding 
process whereby the highest bidder would become the purchaser of the fish. An 
auction can be described as a mechanism whereby the value of a product is 
determined by what buyers are willing to pay and sellers are willing to accept. This 
means that a fish auction is a method whereby sellers and purchasers are able to 
determine the price that is to be paid for the fish product. 
2.1 Auction Economic Theory 
Economic Auction Theory predicts that auctions should conclude with the same price 
as ifboth buyers and sellers are independently competitive and free from the elements 
of risk (Latiff, 2002). According to Armstrong, (2001 , as cited in Latift) based upon 
the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (RET), all types of auctions will give the same 
result provided the following assumptions hold: I) the bidders are risk neutral, 2) 
bidders have independent private values for the item being auctioned, as opposed to 
common values in the instance of possible resale, 3) bidders are symmetric. 
Symmetry means all bidders are on the same footing to the seller and to each other. 
When bidders are symmetric, it is assumed that all bidders have the same purpose for 
the product being bid on., 4) payments are functions of bids only. Any change made 
to these assumptions will invalidate the RET. An Invalidated RET means that the 
prices paid at different types of auctions will not be the same. This means that as 
certain assumptions are relaxed, certain types of auctions may be more beneficial to 
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the buyer or seller. The auctions will not result in the same price. An English auction 
may result in a different price than a sealed bid auction. 
An example of this can be seen in the Newfoundland fishery. Under an auction all 
bidders may not be symmetric. Many harvesters have close fmancial ties to 
processors who have funded their enterprises. Therefore if those processors were to 
bid on a lot of fish, there may be some influence to sell to that buyer at other than the 
price that was bid. Factors such as a sense of loyalty or legal agreements that were 
signed between processors and harvesters may factor into the selection of the 
purchaser. 
Another example could be the high risk factor involved in the Snow Crab fishery in 
this province. Because of the high demand for, and short supply of, Snow Crab, this 
could be a very risky business for those bidding on the product. If processors are not 
able to secure enough products, they may run the risk of high financial loses. 
Therefore a buyer may make a bid that he/she knows will result in a loss but will 
allow him or her to remain in the market. It is important to consider these factors 
when deciding on what type of auction will be utilized. The types of auctions will be 
examined in the next section. 
2.2 Types of Auctions 
There are three types of auctions that have been used to sell fish; the English model, 
the Dutch model and the first-price sealed-bid system. Under the English system, the 
auctioneer calls out higher and higher prices until the last buyer remains. This is the 
most common type of auction in use today (Nordco Limited, 1987). The Dutch 
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system works in the opposite manner with the auctioneer calling out successively 
lower prices until one bidder accepts the price (Nordco Limited, 1987). Dutch 
auction systems usually result in higher prices because bidders are afraid to let the 
price go too far for fear of another buyer getting a lot that they desire. Finally, the 
first-price sealed-bid model works in a similar manner to a tendering system with 
buyers submitting sealed bids directly to the seller (Nordco Limited, 1987). The 
seller than chooses the highest bid. A variation of this auction allows for the winning 
bidder to pay the second highest bid that was made (Milgrom & Webber, 1982 as 
cited in Latiff, 2002). 
Fish auctions can be further sub-divided on the basis whether or not the goods are 
seen prior to being auctioned off. Auctions that offer the goods to be viewed are 
known as display auctions. Display auctions allow the buyer to view the quality of 
the product prior to bidding, thereby allowing the buyer to determine an appropriate 
bid for the goods. An auction where the buyer does not see the goods prior to bidding 
is known as a sight unseen auction. In this case the seller provides information about 
the product to the buyer. The sale is then based on this information. After the lot has 
been sold, the final price will be determined through negotiations between the buyer 
and seller over any discrepancies that may exist between the product that was 
described prior to the sale and the product that was delivered to the buyer (Nordco 
Limited, 1987). 
2.3 Fish Auctions: The European Model 
One ofthe major players in the fishing industry with respect to the use of fish auctions 
has been the European Union (EU). Some countries in the EU have used the auction 
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system for many years and have considerable experience in effectively running such a 
system. Therefore it is a good place to begin examining how a fish auction is set up 
and how it works. For the purposes of this discussion, the main source is Fish 
Business Management, by Andrew Palfi'eman of the University of Hull. This book 
deals in detail with the fish auctions of the EU. 
2.3.1 Evolution of European Auctions 
Before discussing the European model of fish auctions, it is important to discuss why 
these auctions evolved in this part of the world. That is to say, is there anything 
special about Europe that is conducive to fish auctions working in a successful 
manner? In his 1977 report for Elston Food Consultancy, Robert Blair outlines the 
four reasons for the development of auction systems in Europe. First of all, there was 
a need to transport fresh fish quickly. The processors of Europe had found that there 
was a large market for fresh fish; therefore the need arose to get it to market fresh. 
Auctions meant buyers could influence the harvesters to land their catch sooner by 
paying more at the auction. Secondly, the sellers of fish needed to find the largest 
concentration of buyers in order to counterbalance their weakness as sellers of a 
highly perishable product. Thirdly, large markets for fresh fish existed in close 
proximity to the fishing ports. Finally, the system could be justified by the proximity 
ofthe fishing grounds to the population of consumers. According to Blair all of these 
conditions are essential to operate an efficient fish auction system. 
2.3.2 Establisbing an Auction 
The first step taken in most cases when starting up a fish auction in the EU is forming 
a Fish Producers Organization or FPO. This is a voluntary organization of fishing 
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vessel owners and operators that allow them to enter joint arrangements for the 
production and sale of their fish, as defined by EU regulations. Essentially this allows 
those that catch the fish control over the conditions of sale. Those that catch the fish 
are able to take the sale of fish out ofthe hands of fish selling agencies and expose it 
to a more orderly, transparent system that allows them to exercise some control over 
the condition of sale of their fish products. It is important to note that EU fishing 
regulations encourage the formation of such organizations. Consequently, because 
these organizations are formed with the support of EU regulations, they come 
equipped with legal support in the decisions that they make (Palfreman, 1999). 
With the FPO in place, the first task is to identifY the auction site if a display auction 
will be used. One might assume that sites closest to the fishing grounds would be 
optimal for a fish auction but this may not be the case. Because the success of a fish 
auction depends on the availability of participants to bid on the fish, it may be more 
important to locate a fish auction in an area that will allow a larger audience of 
bidders. This may mean that the fish may be landed farther from the fishing grounds 
than would be considered efficient, but the increased competition amongst bidders 
may make it more effective (Palfreman, 1999). 
In the event that FPOs do not want to set up their own auction site, an alternative can 
be found in the use of an independent, commercially competing fish selling company. 
These companies handle the selection of a site and charge a commission to the 
harvesters. The problem with this for the harvesters is they now give up a portion of 
the control that they once had in the sale and marketing of their fish. Therefore, it is 
important for these companies to show fishermen a substantial benefit from using 
their services if they want to succeed (palfreman, 1999). 
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The rules governing who can operate a fish auction in the EU are very stringent. With 
the exception of businesses that are set up specifically to run auctions, no other group 
may run an auction unless it is an FPO or has the support of an FPO. Rules 
governing the setting up of auctions permit FPO's to operate fish selling agencies, 
own a company with other investors, and licence other companies to operate auctions 
(Palfreman, 1999). These rules allow sellers a high level of control over how their 
fish is sold and marketed. The FPO also decides how many of these agencies can be 
selected to sell the fish. Depending on the circumstances, the FPO may decide to 
select more than one company to sell the fish. However, this decision may be limited 
by the customs and practices of the port in which the fish is sold (palfreman, 1999). 
Upon being certified by the FPO as a fish-selling agency, the company will be 
referred to as the Fish Auction Company (FAC). The FAC then has the responsibility 
of locating and securing the fish auction facilities. Such can be owned, leased, or 
rented. They are often owned by harbour authorities (palfreman, 1999). By using 
facilities that are already in existence, the FAC can reduce the start up costs that 
would otherwise occur when building a new facility. The FAC is usually a small 
company with only a few employees. However the company does have a board of 
directors, which has the responsibility of running the company. The importance of 
the board of directors cannot be overestimated. For the directors, the interests of the 
company are supposed to take first priority. Directors who have been found to 
operate in a manner not conducive to the efficient running of the company, or have 
attempted to defraud investors can be held legally responsible (palfreman, 1999). 
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One of the biggest concerns for both buyers and sellers in the fish auction today is the 
ability to deliver a safe, high quality product to the market place. At the end of the 
day, if the consumer is not satisfied, the auction will not be a success. To ensure that 
auctions are safe for the products that they handle, the EU has set down guidelines to 
be followed at the auction site. Meanwhile, buyers bring pressure on suppliers to 
produce a product that has been stored at hygiene and temperature levels sufficient to 
meet the criteria of the consumer (Palfreman, 1999). Of course, in order to increase 
the quality of fish usually means an increase in the cost. This increase in cost has to 
be successfully absorbed by the auction system to make it profitable. This can be 
difficult with species of fish that have low value on the market but require the same 
level of maintenance as high-end fish. Still, the impottance of safe fish for the 
consumer must be a high priority for buyers and sellers alike. 
2,3,3 Responsibilities of Buyers 
Upon completion of the set up of the auction system, the day-to-day operations will 
begin. The time in which the auction begins will be reached through negotiations 
between the FAC and the buyers. The time depends on when the buyers would like to 
begin the processing ofthe fish or when they would like to be able to ship their 
purchase to other customers (Palfreman, 1999). Most auctions will begin at 
approximately 7 A.M (palfreman, 1999). It is very important that the product be 
processed as quickly as possible so as to provide the highest quality product. 
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In theory it is possible for anyone to bid on the product being sold at the auction. 
However this may not be desirable for the FAC. The FAC may want a guarantee by 
bidders that will allow the F AC to recover funds if the buyer fails to meet the 
financial responsibilities set forward in the bid. Guarantees are seldom used in the 
fish auction system for several reasons. First of all, guarantees are expensive for the 
buyer to purchase; therefore the buyer often opposes them. Secondly, it is difficult to 
predict how much the fish will sell for. Consequently, many guarantees are often 
significantly less than the market-clearing price. The result is an amount to the FAC 
that makes a guarantee hardly worthwhile. Finally, as in most industries, those that 
are reliable in both word and reputation can usually be trusted to pay for their 
purchase. This honour system makes the use of guarantees obsolete (palfreman 
1999). While guarantees may not be necessary in most auction systems, they may be 
useful in the early life of an auction. In the start up phase of an auction, it may be 
difficult to assess the reliability of a buyer. Or, there may be a period of adjustment 
as both sides become accustomed to this new method of selling. 
The bidding begins when the auctioneer invites bids from buyers on lots. Lots are one 
or more boxes offish of the same species, size, and freshness. Buyers will express a 
price per unit, (usually in kilograms), to the auctioneer. These bids will then increase 
until there are no more bids for the lot of fish. When the bidding ceases, the buyer 
with the highest bid is allowed to select how much of the lot he or she wishes to 
purchase for that price. It is not required that the buyer take the whole lot of fish. 
This is known as the 'one or all' principle of fish auctions. When the buyer has 
selected the amount of fish he or she wishes to purchase for that amount, the rest of 
the lot is put up for bid again. This continues until the entire lot of fish is sold. Once 
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the fish has been sold to the buyer, the buyer is then required to remove the fish from 
the auction site (Palfreman, 1999). 
It is the responsibility of the auctioneer to note the identity of the buyer in the event 
that problems occur with the purchase. The actual purchase of the fish varies. Some 
FAC's will allow the buyer to take the purchase on credit while others insist on 
payment before the fish is moved. Payment must include all costs including taxes, 
levies, etc. In the event that credit is used, some FPO's have found that some system 
has to be instituted in order to manage the credit. This may mean a time limit upon 
which full payment must be made. In cases where credit is used, guarantees are often 
required (Palfreman, 1999). 
Once the fish has been purchased it becomes the responsibility of the buyer. Any 
damage that occurs to the product after the purchase cannot be held against the FAC. 
In the event that fish purchased is not taken away, the FAC has several options. First 
of all, they can take legal action against the buyer for breach of contract. They can 
rescind the sale of the lot or any other lot of the buyer at that auction or any other 
auction. They can resell the fish by auction or private sale. Finally, they can dispose 
of the fish in some other way. However, this does not mean that the buyer is free 
from any financial responsibility. If there is a difference between the bid price of the 
buyer and the subsequent price received for the fish, the original buyer is required to 
pay that difference (palfreman, 1999). 
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2.3.4 Responsibilities of Sellers 
There are also responsibilities to the seller in the fish auction. The seller is not able to 
sell fish unless he or she is the true owner of the catch and can legally transfer title to 
the buyer. By agreeing to sell the fish through the auction, the seller also agrees to 
pay a commission to the auction company. This commission is usually in the order of 
three percent but can vary somewhat between auction sites. Ifthe FAC is unable to 
sell the catch, it must notify the seller immediately. The seller then has the option of 
offering up the lot again or removing it from the site. In the event that he or she 
chooses to remove it, they are responsible to pay any expenses that the F AC incurred 
while holding the fish. Payment for the sale of the fish to the seller is prompt, usually 
within the day ofthe sale. Sellers should receive a Sales Note with their payment that 
shows all deductions as well as quantity sold and the price received for the sale. This 
highlights the importance of quick payment of the buyer for the sale to allow the F AC 
to pay the seller quickly (Palfreman, 1999). 
2.3.5 Responsibilities ofFAC 
While both the seller and buyer have responsibilities to the FAC, the F AC is in turn, 
accountable to the seller and buyer. Probably the biggest part that the F AC plays is in 
the supply of information to its customers. This includes a daily report of the volume, 
species, size and grade of the fish expected to be on the market that day, a summary 
of the transactions for that day, and a daily list of offers to buy fish from outside the 
auction. As well, the FAC should prepare a forecast of expected supplies of fish for 
buyers and sellers and a monthly statement of the value offish sales, volume, species, 
size, and grade for the buyers and sellers (palfreman. 1999). By doing this, it allows 
those using the service to make sound economic judgements that should be to the 
benefit ofthe industry as a whole. 
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The fish auction is also able to use its own discretion for fish sales outside the fish 
market. For example, if the company feels that it is able to improve the value of the 
fish by selling it outside of the auction, it is allowed to do that (Palfreman, 1999). It is 
important to keep all members of the FPO informed of these actions. This allows the 
FPO to feel that all of its members are being treated fairly and are open to the same 
opportunities as other members. 
Finally, auction systems in recent years have experimented with the sale of farmed 
fish as well. Usually an auction will notifY buyers before hand if farmed fish will be 
available. This is done to generate interest on the part of the buyer and to boost the 
price for the seller. If the product is unable to generate a reserve price then it can be 
withdrawn from the market (palfreman, 1999). 
2.3.6 Dutch Auction System 
While this is the general method offish auction operation in the EU, there are some 
variations practised in other systems. As stated above, most auctions are voluntary. 
Individuals have the right to take part in the auction if they choose to do so. 
However, under the Dutch auction system, an Auction Master is contracted by the 
government to run the auction. Also, the auction itself can only be established by an 
act of parliament. The persons who take part in such an auction are not voluntarily 
doing so but are bound to do so by law. The Dutch system works on a descending 
price scale. The initial bid for the lot of fish starts very high and then descends. 
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When the price arrives a point at which the buyer wants to buy, the buyer intervenes 
and chooses the amount of fish to buy at that price. Then the bidding resumes 
(Palfreman, 1999). 
2.4 Electronic Auctions 
With the advent of new technology in almost all sectors of society, it should not be 
surprising that electronic technology is now becoming increasingly common in fish 
auctions. Countries such as the Netherlands, France and Belgium now employ what 
is known as the computerized auction system. Essentially an auction 'clock' replaces 
the auctioneer and a computer records the details of each sale from the different 
vessels. The 'clock' has either a figurative rotating arm or a rapidly changing price 
that the buyer can stop remotely when a price is reached whereby they reel it is a good 
time to buy. Each successful sale is entered into a computer manually, which 
calculates a sales return for the vessel and a few hours later a sales return is issued for 
the vessel. 
Since the introduction of computers into auctions there has been a significant increase 
in the use of electronic auctions as well as an increase in what can be done through an 
electronic auction. In October of200 I, Fishgale began operations in the port of Hull 
on the northeast coast of England. This state-of-the-art fish trading centre has several 
advantages over other fish auctions. First of all, the entire operation uses a chill 
system to ensure that the temperature remains constant for the fish. The fish are 
constantly held at 2 degrees Centigrade, except when it is being graded, when the 
temperature is increased to 12 degrees. This type of handling helps to ensure high 
quality fish. (Seafood International, 2002). Another difference with the Fishgale is 
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the ability to trace fish from the area and time where it is caught right through to the 
point when it is sold. The ability to do this has become very popular with buyers as 
they now are able to buy fish from a particular harvester. The ability of Fishgate to 
provide these services lies in the use of electronic technology. From the cleaning 
systems to the weighing and grading to the temperature control, computers control 
everything. However, this use oftechnology is not confined to the control of these 
systems. Soon, Fishgate will be introducing internet trading into its services. This 
introduction will allow the auction to connect with service providers as well as buyers 
across Europe. The ability to do this allows Fishgate to attract a wider audience for 
its auctions. This allows a larger marketplace than it could possibly have if it 
remained as a display auction confined by physical boundaries. Buyers from all over 
Europe can buy fish from this auction without ever leaving their offices. This offers a 
tremendous advantage to the Fishgate auction. 
According to some sources, one advantage of electronic fish auctions from a sellers 
viewpoint is the ability to reduce the likelihood of rigging during a floor auction. If 
buyers are congregated on an auction floor, the opportunity to rig auctions among 
themselves is present but, electronic auctions allow bidders to bid from outside the 
auction site without joining together with other buyers. This means there is less 
opportunity for buyers to collude (Seafood International, 2001). This argument is 
weak at best, collusion has seldom been seen as a problem in auctions and buyers do 
not need to be on the auction floor in order to try and keep prices down. It would 
appear that if collusion is a problem, it may be due to a lack of buyers involved in the 
auction. This highlights the greatest benefit of electronic fish auctions in that buyers 
are able to bid on a lot while separated by physical boundaries. Therefore buyers that 
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were unable to bid before because o. f distance from the auction floor now have the 
ability to do so. Another benefit for-:- buyers is the ability to bid on fish at more than 
one auction site. If they lose out at Itone particular auction, they may be able to 
capitalize on another while never lesaving their office. This is very efficient for the 
buyers. If the buyer is hooked up eld ectronically to multiple auction sites it will spare 
them the trouble of deciding on whi .. ch auction to attend. For the seller, this means 
increased competition for their catc\:fl that should generate an increase in prices. 
2.5 Summary 
The European fish auctions were esfltablished in order to provide a closer link between 
the landing of fresh fish and the co~sumer. The system has continued to evolve over 
time into a very technologically reli;aable system that allows buyers from all over the 
world to bid on fish through the Int~rnet. This continued evolution manifests the 
confidence that all participants hav~ in the auction system. The auction system 
provides an openness to the Europe~n fishing industry that appears to have satisfied 
those that take part in the industry. Also, the rules and regulations that govern the 
industry appear to have the best int~rest of the industry in mind with all participants 
having guidelines and responsibiliti"es. The ability of the auction to continue to 
expand shows the effectiveness it h~as as a price determination mechanism. 
The expansion of auctions to allow more buyers into the market has advantages for 
both buyers and sellers. Sellers beInefit from increased competition that drives up 
prices. Buyers benefit from the abiflity they now have to put a price on the quality of 
fish they wish to buy as well as inc..-easing quality as sellers attempt to increase 
quality in order to obtain better pri""es. Under a system that does not reward quality, 




3.0. History of Fish Pricing in Iceland 
Up until 1961, pricing was a major source of tension between those selling and those 
buying fish in Iceland. As a result, the Althing (i.e. govemment) of Iceland 
introduced legislation that established an official process for determining prices paid 
for fish. This process is known as the Fishing Industry Price Determination Board. 
The Board is made up of two tiers. The first level consists of six representatives of 
the fish harvesters unions and six representatives ofthe boat owners associations. If 
this group cannot decide on a price, the dispute moves to the second tier. This tier is 
made up of two representatives from each group as well as a member appointed by 
the government. Decisions are made by simple majority rule. The problem with this 
type of system was that the distribution of influence was not equal between harvester 
and owner. Vessel owners were able to manipulate the decisions of the board. As a 
result prices paid for wet fish (or fresh fish) in Iceland were often 30 - 50010 lower 
than those paid for the same fish on continental Europe. Another problem was that 
the negotiated price was supposed to be set as a minimum price. However, the result 
was often the minimum price being the selling price. The only alternatives for 
Icelandic harvesters were to either ship their catch directly from their boats to market 
or to ship their catch freshly iced in containers. This system continued until the late 
eighties when it carne under criticism for being inflexible to changes in market 
conditions. The outcome of this criticism was the introduction of special legislation 
that permitted the establishment of wet fish auctions in 1987 (Amason, 1995). 
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3.1 Icelandic Fish Auctions 
Figure 1: Distribution of auction sites as of2002. 
The normal fish auctions between buyers and harvesters in rceland are divided into 
two categories, Islandmarkadur and Reiknistofa Fiskmarkada (Amarson &Trondsen, 
2003). These two auction markets came about as a result in differences in software 
and bidding methods. Prior to this, there was only one market (Latilf, 2002). 
Islandmarkadur uses the Dutch bidding system while Reiknistofa Fiskmarkada uses 
the English bidding system but a buyer is free to buy from any of the two auction 
systems. Each market has between 15-19 smaller sub markets distributed around the 
Icelandic coast. (Amarson & Trondsen, 2003). These fish auctions have a number of 
primary functions including: 
1. Recording infonnation about supply of fish prior to the auction taking 
place. 
2. Recording infonnation about sales during auctions. 
3. Supplying and maintaining connections to remote auction places, if 
auctions are located in more than one place. 
4. Maintaining detailed information about consumers, buyers, and sellers. 
27 
5. Maintaining information about fees to be collected by the fish market from 
buyers and sellers. 
6. Issuing invoices to buyers and keeping track of payments and information 
about buyers' credit balances in real time. 
7. Preparing and issuing financial statements to sellers. 
8. Offering computerized dial-service for buyers. 
9. Serving as an information database, which includes supplying various 
sales reports and other information, and statistics, which are available for 
any time period since implementation of the systems (Amarson, & 
Trondsen, 2003). 
3.2 The Auction System 
The day begins with staff ofthe auction company entering all pertinent information 
into the computer. This includes information received from the ships about their 
catch as well as information on transportation as well as service charges. Ifvessels do 
not submit their catch data by a certain time, it will be carried over, to be auctioned on 
the following day. The information from all the smaller markets is sent to one central 
computer located at the main auction house. All the information received from each 
market is compiled on one list and distributed for the use of buyers. This will mainly 
consist ofinformation about the vessel, type offish onboard, condition offish, fishing 
gear used, etc (Latiff, 2002). 
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As the auction begins, the operator at each smaller sub auction will enter into the 
computer how many buyers are bidding. Under the English system, the price will 
continue to increase until only one buyer remains. At this point, the price on the clock 
is the price to be paid by that buyer. A credit check is done on that buyer. At the end 
of the week, all invoices will be sent to each buyer for payment due to the auction 
house. The auction house will then pay the seller (Latiff, 2002). 
3.2.1 The Catch 
When the catch is landed it is weighed twice: first at the landing harbour authority 
(gross weight), and, again, at the fish market scale (net weight). At this point the 
auction house will take charge of the catch. The auction company has implemented 
the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) to ensure the safety and quality 
of the catch (Latiff, 2002). 
3.2.2 Disputes 
If there is any dispute between the buyer and seller based on wrong infonnation about 
the catch, the auction house will act as the arbitrator. The seller must accept the price 
that results from the bidding at the auction. If there is a disagreement on the size or 
quality of the catch, a representative from the auction house will decide the outcome. 
If the buyer's claims are accepted, the seller has to pay compensation. Ifthe seller' s 
claims are accepted, the buyer has to pay compensation. If there is a great 
discrepancy between descriptions on the auction list and what the buyer has bought, 
the buyer may revoke the sale. If the auction house receives a considerable number of 
claims about a particular seller, they reserve the right not to conduct business with 
that seller in the future (Lartiff, 2002). 
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3.3 Iceland's Fish Auction Influence 
The sales offish in Iceland can be divided into four categories: sales through auctions; 
sales through foreign auctions (containers); landings by Icelandic vessels abroad; and 
contract sales. Traditionally, sales of fish have been through contract sales and the 
landing of wet fish trawlers abroad (Amason & Trondsen, 2003). The growth of 
auction sales has been steady since it was introduced in 1987. In 1988, the first full 
year ofthe auction operation, sales offish through the auction accounted for 9% of 
total sales. In 1996, 32% of fish landed in Iceland had gone through the auction. At 
the same time, contract sales fell from 75% to 57% and foreign sales have fallen to 
II % during that same period (Amason & Trondsen, 2003). These results show how 
successful the auction market has been to the Icelandic fishery. These findings show 
the effectiveness of fish auctions in Iceland to curtail the amount of fish it was losing 
to outside markets. 
3.3.1 Price Determination 
Perhaps the greatest measure of whether or not the Icelandic auctions are effective as 
a system of price determination can be found in the prices they pay as compared to 
contact sales, as well as prices paid at mainland European auctions. A comparison of 
the prices paid at auctions and through contract sales between 1988 and 1996 show 
that auction prices in Iceland have been almost twice as high as contract sale prices 
(Amason & Trondsen, 2003). These prices mean a considerable recovery of revenue 
for fishermen who sell to an auction as opposed to selling through contract sales. 
Between 1994 and 1996 this difference was reduced considerably, but this appears to 
be a function of auction prices raising the prices paid by contract. A comparison of 
Icelandic auctions with U.K. auctions shows that Icelandic auction prices are lower 
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than their counterparts in the U.K. However, when export penalties are added into the 
equation, Icelandic prices and U.K. prices are very similar (These penalties are 
assessed to curb the amount of fish being exported into the U.K. market and are 





















Figure 2: Differences in Prices paid through auctions and contract sales, 1988- 1996. 
3.3.2 Quality 
While prices have shown considerable increases in both auctions and contract sales, it 
would be erroneous to assume that an increase in quality has also occurred. That is not 
to say that Iceland has poor quality. Iceland has very good quality fish. But it does 
not appear that the introduction of an auction has increased the quality to any 
substantial degree. 
There are a couple of reasons that have been put forward to explain this phenomenon. 
First of all, according to Sigurdur Jonsson (personal contact, Fishery Products 
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International, 2002), quality has not improved in Iceland simply because the auctions 
are operating in a sellers' market. Demand exceeds supply in the Icelandic fisheries 
at this point in time. Buyers are forced to buy poorer quality fish simply because they 
have to in order to fill their orders. There is less pressure on harvesters to produce 
better quality under these circumstances because buyers are forced to compete with 
each other not for the best quality fish but for market share. 
Secondly, the distance between landing sites and processing sites is often quite a 
distance to transport fresh fish. The further fish has to be transported before it is 
processed, the more time it spends decomposing and the result is a poorer quality 
product. However, the two auction market systems (Islandsmarkadur, and 
Reiknistofa) have developed a new company that owns all the fish boxes and 
containers that are used to transport fish. The buyers then rent these boxes. The result 
ofthis system is an efficient method of transporting fish that allows fish to reach its 
destination that same day (Arnarson & Trondsen, 2003). This type of cooperation 
helps to cut down on transportation costs and produces an effective method of 
improving quality by streamlining the transport system. 
It would appear that most buyers are confident in the quality of fish that they are 
receiving through the fish auction as 75% of the fish that goes through the market is 
sold before it is landed (Latiff, 2002). This is due to the ability of buyers to purchase 
confidently based on the reputation of harvesters to be consistent in the quality that 
they land. 
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3.3.3 Industry Organization 
Presently, there are two categories of vessels in Iceland, vessels that are owned by 
processing plant owners and those that are not. The fish auctions receive most of their 
fish from those that are not owned by the owners of processing plants. These vessels 
also tend to be smaller than the vessels that do not land to auctions. However, some 
ofthese processor-owned boats do contribute to the auction. For them, the auction is 
an outlet for surplus (Amason & Trondsen, 2003). Here, it is easy to see some of the 
similarities that exist between Iceland and Newfoundland. In this province right now, 
there are two types of harvesters, larger boats that are owned by processing companies 
and smaller boats owned by independent harvesters. It is important to note that for 
some of these smaller boat owners, while their fishing vessels are not owned by the 
processors, the harvesters are indebted to them, as processor-financing was used as a 
method of securing financing for the expansion of their enterprises. It would appear 
however that if an auction were implemented in Newfoundland and Labrador, it 
would be the smaller boats that would most likely use it. Larger vessels that are 
owned by processing companies would rarely use these auctions unless as in Iceland 
they would be used as an outlet for surplus catch. 
One unforeseen benefit of operating an auction in Iceland has been the increase in the 
number of smaller processing companies. When the fish auction was originally 
instituted, it was done as a method of determining prices for fish. Also, prior to the 
fish auction, if a processor bought fish, helshe was required to buy the whole 
boatload. This often meant buying fish of various species and quality. It also meant 
that the larger, more financially secure plants, were the only plants that could do so. 
These plants specialized in processing large portions of semi-processed fish. The 
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auction has allowed processors to buy smaller lots of fish as well as providing an 
outlet for fish that may not have been profitable for larger companies to process. This 
has led to smaller processors entering into the industry and creating niche markets. 
These processors are able to buy smaller quantities of fish that may be rejected by 
larger companies and tailor them to meet a specific market with a very high quality 
product. This has been one of the major contributors to the increase in the value of 
landings, despite a decrease in the quantity of cod in Iceland (Amason & Trondsen, 
2003). 
3.4 Summary 
In summation, it appears that the Icelandic experiment has been successful based on 
the following reasons. First of all, there has been in overall increase in prices paid for 
fish at auctions as well as through contract sales. While this may not specifically be 
the result ofthe fish auction being instituted, (other factors such as an increase in 
demand may be at work), it is also true that prices have not fallen under an auction. 
However, it remains to be seen what would happen in a buyers market. Perhaps even 
more important is the ability of buyers to buy fish unseen and be satisfied with the 
level of quality they receive. 
At first the reorganization of the processing sector would appear to be a negative 
occurrence for fish auctions. Since fish auctions have been utilized, larger companies 
through consolidation, have replaced many of the medium sized companies. This 
usually means less competition and fewer jobs in the industry. However, larger 
companies are better able to compete on global markets. Meanwhile, a number of 
small companies have entered into the industry to replace the jobs that disappeared 
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when the medium sized companies were removed. There has been a change in the 
size distribution of fish processing companies in Iceland that has replaced medium 
sized companies with larger more globally competitive companies and small 
companies with few employees that target specific markets with perhaps one type of 
product. 
Finally, because of the higher prices and the increased competition in the Icelandic 
processing industry, Iceland has been able to reclaim much of the fish that was being 
landed at ports in other parts of Europe. As a consequence, the value of the fishing 
industry in Iceland has increased. The use of fish auctions in Iceland has shown that 
the fishing industry can survive, and even grow, despite limited amounts of resources. 
While the fish auction in Iceland has been a success for buyers and sellers in the 
fishing industry, it will not solve all the problems ofthe industry. For Iceland, the 
ability ofthe auction to continue to satisry the needs of buyers and sellers lies in the 
ability of the companies in Iceland to compete in a global market. The auctions 
should continue to operate as long as processing fish in Iceland is viable. Also, 
auctions are unable to influence fish stocks, the demands of consumers, or the 
fisheries of other countries. As a source of price determination, auctions work very 
well. But these auctions are subject to other forces that are uncontrollable, just as 
other forms of price determination are as well. 
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4.0 Fish Auctions In Newfoundland 81& Labrador 
This province has had very little experie ...... ce with auctions as a method of price 
detennination. However, it is not a total l!ly new concept. During the mid-eighties, the 
Provincial government operated a fish aUDction. At this time, the Newfoundland 
government was operating a group ofmiCllddle distance vessels that were fishing for 
groundfish. These vessels were operatinp g under the premise that high quality fish 
could be landed in this Province. Theref"cmre they employed fishing tactics and 
technology that would give them that higgh quality. It is also very important to 
remember that at that point in time most . of the fish that was being landed in the 
inshore fishery was of very poor quality. _ The result was competition among the 
buyers for who would have the opportunility to buy this fish for the same price that was 
being paid for the poorer quality inshore , fish (Alastair O'Reilly, personal contact 
2002). 
The government decided to take advantalllge of this situation by auctioning off the 
catch from their middle distance fleet. -nne government would infonn buyers of the 
time and place that the vessel would arri<ive and the amount of fish onboard. Buyers 
would then submit bids on the catch. Q ... ality was detennined by an independent 
grader and prices were based on Grade M quality fish. Prices would be 70% of the 
Grade A price for Grade B Cod and 30~ for Grade C. The result ofthis system 
proved to be very successful for the govwernment, as they would receive prices 
considerably higher than those paid for i inshore cod, sometimes fetching prices twice 
as high. Under these circumstances, a ffish auction proved to be a very successful 
operation (Alastair O'Reilly, personal cc:ontact). 
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4.0.1 Price Determination in the Prese"",t 
In 1997, the opening of the Newfoundland. and Labrador Snow Crab season was 
delayed for three months by a price dispute between harvesters and processors. This 
disruption in the industry was significal1t e nough to cause the provincial government 
to appoint a task force to study the price settlement mechanisms and to recommend 
alternatives that would prevent such dispud:es in the future. Numerous 
recommendations were made but two in particular, standout at this time. Included in 
these recommendations were final offer se lection, which has been used extensively 
and fish auctions, which this research is fa:><:using on. 
While little has been made ofthe recomme ndation of instituting a trial fish auction, 
final offer selection was implemented as tJl1e main method of finalizing minimum 
prices for most species in this Province. hn final offer selection, both sides attempt to 
negotiate a price for the upcoming fish i ng season. If they are unable to come to an 
agreement, the process will then be hander<! over to an arbitrator who will look at the 
arguments put forward by both sides arJd tthen pick a price that seems reasonable. 
That price will then be used as the mini mt:.lm price for that season. Since that system 
was implemented, prices have been settled on time and the fishing season has been 
underway at its normal and optimal time. Both sides appeared to be happy with this 
system. 
However, recently the Fisheries Associ ati<on of Newfoundland and Labrador (FANL) 
decided to opt out of final offer selection. The former president ofFANL, Alastair 
O'Rielly argues that while final offer seleoction was very effective at settling prices, it 
did little to solve other issues, claiming th1at the process is weighted in favour of the 
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union (Navigator, 2003). Meanwhile, trying to avert any type of disruption, the 
provincial government introduced legislation that will ensure that final offer selection 
will continue for one more year. As collective bargaining did not work, and now final 
offer selection is in danger of collapsing, what alternatives are there for the future? 
Does the answer lie in instituting a fish auction as a method of price detennination in 
this Province? 
4.1 Issues in the Newfoundland & Labrador Fishing Industry 
The 1998 Task force outlined various issues with respect to price detennination in its 
report such as the effects ofthe 1997 strike, trust and transparency, competition, port 
designation, legislation, quality, marketing, outside buyers, the resources, research, 
timing and conduct of negotiations. These issues provide a wide variety of problems 
in the industry that need to be addressed. The question is: can a fish auction aid in the 
resolution of any of these problems? 
4.1.1 Collective Bargaining. 
Since 1971, collective bargaining has been the process whereby prices have been set 
in the fishing industry in this Province (Vardy et ai, 1998). It was under this system 
that both parties would agree on a price. While the purpose of an auction may be to 
detennine the price paid for raw material, would it be necessary for collective 
bargaining to still exist as a safety net? As mentioned earlier, when Iceland 
implemented its fish auction, it was decided that the Fishing Industry Price 
Detennination Board would continue to set the minimum price that could be paid to 
fish harvesters. Eventually, it became unnecessary to set these prices as auction 
prices seldom dipped to these levels. 
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The FF A W contends that any fish auction would have to be supported by legislation 
that would force all fish landed in this Province to go through that auction (John 
Boland, personal contact, 2001). Ifthis were the case, there would be no need for any 
other fonn of price settlement to occur. While not in agreement with the need to send 
all product through the auction, FANL does agree that collective bargaining would 
not be necessary. In fact, FANL were not convinced that collective bargaining should 
exist now, since as soon as negotiations are completed, the real prices are settled 
among processors and harvesters in private negotiations (Alastair O ' Rielly, personal 
contact, 2002). 
4.1.2 Quality. 
One complaint that the Newfoundland and Labrador fishing industry has consistently 
held is the inconsistency of the quality of its seafood. One area where fish auctions 
could, in theory, make a major improvement for the Newfoundland fishery is in this 
area. At the heart ofthe auction system is the premise that people will pay more for a 
better product. Therefore those that are able to return a better product to the shore 
will be compensated significantly more than those who do not. 
Take for example the Northern Shrimp Industry. Over the past few years, much of 
the problems with shrimp quality have been attributed to the inshore fleet. Because of 
the small size these vessels were limited in their ability to carry shrimp in a manner 
that can produce the best quality. Most boats have to bag their shrimp instead of 
using insulated boxes, and only four boats are pennitted to freeze at sea. Still others 
are of such small size that they are forced to sacrifice quality for quantity. This 
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results in a significantly poorer quality of shrimp. Yet because of the method of price 
settlement, there was no incentive for boat owners to take action to improve quality. 
Boat A with poor quality shrimp received the same as boat B with excellent quality 
shrimp. An auction system could be the simplest method for improving this problem. 
Buyers could decide to pay more for good quality shrimp if it is more valuable to 
them. There may be other methods of improving quality such as improving trucking 
distances and decreasing the amount of summer harvesting but auctions create an 
openness that would allow fishermen to see the benefits of trying to improve quality. 
Most agree that in theory a fish auction would improve the quality of fish but, it may 
not happen independent of other changes in the fishery as well. One concern brought 
forward by the FFA W (John Boland) is the fact that much ofthe problem with quality 
in this Province lies in the inability to land resources at the optimal time of year. 
Presently, most fishing activities take place during the summer months when warm 
weather increases the decay speed for fish landed. Part of the problem here lies with 
the vessel replacement rules that forbid fishermen from using larger vessels that 
would allow them to fish in times of the year when conditions are bad but quality 
would be improved. While fishermen may be able to make improvements onboard 
their vessels that could improve quality, they are still unable to fish when it would be 
optimal for the industry due to these restrictions. 
Mr 0 ' Reilly is not convinced that the introduction of an auction will necessarily 
result in better quality. He points to the time of the year that catches are landed 
coupled with the distance that much of the fish has to be trucked. A major problem 
for processors is the distance from the fishing grounds to the processing plants. It is 
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not uncommon, especially during gluts, for product to be waiting two or three days on 
trucks in the middle of summer to be processed. All the while it is waiting it is losing 
yield and losing quality. He also points to the inability of processors to coordinate 
trucking schedules. It is not uncommon for trucks to leave an area empty while 
fishermen are awaiting the arrival of a truck to take their catch. It may be plausible 
that fishermen could improve their quality to better take advantage of an auction but if 
the processor cannot receive it in an optimal time, there may not be a net gain to the 
industry. 
4.1.3 Competition. 
Another premise of an effective fish auction is plenty of competition. Presently in 
this Province there are various sizes of buyers from big multi-national companies to 
smaller companies with only one plant in one small community. It is difficult in any 
industry for small companies to compete with larger companies, especially when 
competing for limited resources. Therefore this may present a problem with any 
future fish auctions in this Province. If larger companies are able to outbid smaller 
companies for better products, it may lead to a situation where smaller companies are 
left to buy inferior raw material because they do not have the financial resources to 
compete for better quality product. Companies that are in a better financial situation 
whether large or small will have a significant advantage in this market. Ifthis holds 
true, can these smaller companies be expected to continue to exist under such 
conditions? 
This may not be a problem according to the FFA W simply because plants are only 
able to process a limited amount of product at a time. It would not make sense for a 
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plant to buy a large amount of product at an above average price and then have it 
deteriorate aboard trucks while it is waiting to be processed. This is a problem under 
the present system but makes even less sense under an auction. Another problem is 
that any company that buys a product above what it will sell for and then allows that 
product to decline so that it is even less valuable will have a tough time remaining in 
business. 
F ANL (now defunct), on the other hand, had expected that under an auction there 
would be negative impacts on the smaller plants, especially those plants that due to 
their geographic location, are disadvantaged by distance. According to O'Rielly, 
before the industry decides on whether or not it wants a fish auction, it is going to 
have to decide on what direction it will take with regard to rural communities in this 
Province that depend on the fishery. The history offish auctions has shown that when 
a site has been chosen for operation, it tends to become a major port and landing site. 
This increase in traffic comes at the expense of communities that do not operate an 
auction or an auction landing site. Presently there are hundreds of ports in 
Newfoundland where harvesters are permitted to land their catch. If an auction was 
instituted, in one community, that proved to be successful, there would be a tendency 
for harvesters and processors to migrate there simply because it would make 
economic sense. This may be possible for larger companies, but can small single 
plant operations adapt to such a situation? In many communities, these plants are all 
that remains for employment. What happens to these communities? Will a fish 
auction encourage resettlement? 
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This is a very significant issue for the processors ofthis Province. If there were to be 
an accumulation of fishing industry activity in specific areas of the Province, it would 
greatly impact processors. First of all, those who were closest to the activity would 
have an immediate competitive advantage over those that are farther away. Secondly, 
if processors move to these new areas they may find themselves further from 
shipping points for exporting their processed products. This would probably mean 
these costs would become equal for all processors but the change may have been 
positive or negative depending on where the processor relocated from. 
One method of encouraging more competition in a fish auction would have been to 
allow buyers from outside the Province to bid on fish here and truck it out to be 
processed. However, this is not likely to happen for a couple of reasons. First of all, 
there are fewer and fewer companies to let into this market. Companies in this 
Province have purchased many of the smaller companies that lie in neighbouring 
Provinces. Secondly, according to the FFA W, the quality of the product is very poor 
by the time it gets to its out of Province destination, especially in the case of crab, 
which has to be processed while it is alive. Both the representatives from the FF A W 
and what was formerly FANL agree that there is probably enough competition here to 
run an auction for most species. 
4.1.4 Marketing. 
Another area of concern that the Newfoundland fishing industry has to deal with is the 
marketing of our fish products. The 1998 task force( Vardy et al) found that due to its 
small size in the world market, Newfoundland has little ability to influence prices and 
consequently has become a price taker. The advent of an auction system may have 
little ability to improve this situation; in fact according to F ANL it may harm us. 
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One major concern brought forward by FANL was the potential problems that 
companies may have in meeting contracts with their buyers. Many of the processors 
in this Province operate under what is known as Program Business. This means they 
sign contracts to supply a certain amount of product to buyers. This type of business 
is usually done at the high end of the market therefore; it usually means higher prices 
for these products. Some members of F ANL fear that under an auction system, if 
they are unable to bid high enough to secure product, they may be unable to meet the 
conditions of their contracts. As a consequence, their reputation as a supplier is 
harmed in the market and they may lose their position at the high end of the market. 
Not only would this affect the company that cannot meet its commitments but also the 
Newfoundland industry may be classified as unreliable. This may have a snowball 
effect throughout the industry, as fewer buyers would be able to pay high prices for 
products. 
4.1.5 Fishing Vessel Ownership. 
One issue of concern raised by the FF A W is the issue of fleet separation. The 
evolution of the fishing industry in this Province has led to a situation of increasing 
dependence of harvesters on processors as a method to secure fmancing for their 
enterprises. As well, processors have helped other fishermen purchase enterprises 
with the agreement that the harvester would then supply all of their catch to that 
processor. Harvesters feel that this is causing them to lose their bargaining power and 
independence to the processors. This then, is another reason that harvesters would 
like to see all material go through an auction. If this should occur, it could mean that 
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a processor might send out a boat in which it has invested and acquired some 
management control but not receive any raw material in return. The FFA W feels that 
this would also discourage many buyers to from buying fishing enterprises, as it 
would no longer mean a sure supply of product for the processor. However, ifboat 
owners continue to feel that they are obligated to supply fish to a processor that has 
helped to finance the enterprise, they may choose to continue to sell the catch directly 
to the buyer at whatever price is offered. Because of the complexity of the 
arrangements between harvesters and processors, it may not be even possible for 
harvesters to sell through an auction. 
F ANL too, had some concerns about this issue. If an auction were to be instituted, 
their members would like some assurance that they would receive money to recover 
the funds that they have invested in financing vessels and enterprises. They suggest 
that if the government wants a fish auction, they should cover the cost that the 
processors have invested in harvesters to allow the fishery to grow, since the demise 
of the Fisheries Loan Board. 
Ideally, harvesters should be separated from processors if an auction was to take 
place. This would ensure that the demands of a fair auction are met. As mentioned 
earlier, in order for an auction to achieve a fair price, there must be symmetry of 
buyers. If there is a linkage between buyer and seller in an auction system, it may not 
operate in an effective manner. 
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4.1.6 Condition of Resources. 
Marine resources across the world are diminishing. The East Coast of Canada has 
been hit especially hard, particularly the once abundant Northern Cod Stocks. This 
means that harvesters and processors are attempting to increase the profitability of 
their businesses while having less resource with which to accomplish this. Under an 
auction system, this may advantage the harvesters if demand should exceed supply. 
While a shortage of supply may hurt everyone in the long run, harvesters could 
benefit immediately if demand should suddenly increase, as buyers would be willing 
to pay more in order to secure product. An auction would be quicker to respond to 
changes in market conditions. 
However, the lack of resource was of great concern to F ANL. A fish auction could 
create insecurity of raw material supply for their processing plants to process. These 
processing plants tend to have a high operating costs and large amounts of capital tied 
up in the operation. The problem arises when these large plants are unable to operate 
consistently because they lost out on the bidding floor that morning. For plants to 
operate efficiently the must operate at as high a capacity as possible, if they do not do 
so, they lose money. If a buyer is only able to secure enough resource to operate for 
half a day each week, it may be difficult to operate at all. FANL feels that plants that 
are unionized are especially disadvantaged under a fish auction due to contracts that 
force them to do certain things that a non-unionized plant may not have to do. Non-
unionized plants may not have to guarantee certain amount of hours for there workers 
in order for them to come into work or they may be able to pay for only the hours 
worked which unionized plants may not be able to do due to contract stipulations. 
Non-uni onized plants may be more flexible. Also, unionized plants tend to pay 
higher """ages to its workers, which could put them at a disadvantage. 
4.1.6.1 Production Quotas 
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However, the processors do have a proposed solution to under-capacity in their plants. 
For a nHlmber of years now they have declared the benefits of bringing in production 
quotas I"or processors. Under such a system, they could more effectively manage their 
operations. They could decide when to operate and they could be sure they had 
enough product to operate efficiently. FANL feels that this type of system would 
benefit the entire industry and make a fish auction unnecessary. 
One pnoblem that is made manifest in the above situation is the condition that our fish 
stocks ;are in. Every plant in this Province is operating below capacity simply because 
there is not enough fish stocks to provide enough quota. While there is little that can 
be done about this, it is the driving factor that affects every fishery decision in this 
Provinc e. From FANL's point of view, there may not be enough fish to support the 
industry in its present size if an auction were introduced. From the FFAW's point of 
view, production quotas, which would solve some ofthe plants problems, are bad for 
com)JC'lition. There is no solution that will not result in someone getting hurt. Yet 
govem ment has to decide between auctions and production quotas. 
4.1.7 Trust. 
Almost everyone in this Province will agree that the relationship between harvesters 
and processors is guided by mistrust. This mistrust has become a part of our culture. 
Both sides in the fishery agree that a lack of trust has hindered the growth of the 
industry but they also agree that there is little that can be done. But would this type of 
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relationship interfere with an auction system? According to Mr. 0' Rielly, iffish 
auctions did not increase prices paid to fishermen, the processors would certainly be 
accused of fixing this system as well. No matter what system is adopted here, it can 
only work if it is ttansparent. Fishermen need to be able to see that their prices are a 
reflection of market conditions. [n this Province right now, there is a gas price 
regulation board. This was set up to ensure that gas prices remained stable and that 
they reflect true market changes. While Crab prices are monitored also during the 
season to adjust to changes in the world market, it is unable to take into account such 
things as bonuses or other perks paid out to some harvesters. It appears that the true 
prices that processors have the ability to pay are never uncovered. Maybe an 
independent board could monitor these activities to ensure that everyone gets their fair 
share of the pie and maybe some trust can be restored to the fishery. 
According to Ray Andrews (personal contact, 2002), of Fishery Products 
[nternational, a fish auction system would go a long way to improving relations 
between fishermen and processors because it would create openness in the fishing 
industry. Because FP[ is a publicly traded company, it must accountable to its 
shareholders in how it spends it money. All the money it spends must be accounted 
for. [t is unable to compete in under the table deals. If all buyers were bidding at an 
auction there would be no private deals and all industry participants could feel 
confident in the prices they receive. One of the big issues in the industry is the lack of 
openness in the industry and auctions may be able to change that. 
48 
4.2 Issues 
The introduction to this paper outlined four issues that were very important with 
respect to operating a fish auction in this Province. From the information that was 
gathered with respect to auctions in Iceland and the present situation in the 
Newfoundland and Labrador fishery, this paper will attempt to provide direction on 
these issues. 
4.2.1 Wbat benefits can tbe fisbing industry in tbis Province expect from an 
auction? 
The main reason for examining the issue with respect to fish auctions in this Province 
arose from the increasing difficulty for harvesters and processors to obtain price 
settlements through collective bargaining. These disagreements delayed the start of 
the fishing season and caused much disruption for both sides of the disputes. The 
benefit of using an auction system as a price settlement mechanism is that it makes 
these negotiations unnecessary and can allow the fishery to begin on time. Under an 
auction, choices are left up to individual harvesters and processors as to the prices 
they are willing to accept instead of trying to identify a price that is considered fair 
and meets the needs of all participants in collective bargaining. The initial planning 
stage of an auction may require discussion between the parties involved but once the 
auction begins operation, market forces should allow it to govern itself and the prices 
paid in the fishery. Therefore, fisheries that are under the auction system should 
begin with little problems. This is perhaps the greatest advantage to the 
Newfoundland and Labrador fishery at this time. 
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Another expected benefit for the fishing industry would be the creation of an open 
atmosphere of business between buyers and sellers in this Province. One of the 
problems with the fishery in recent years has been the use of "bonuses" or rebates as a 
method of persuading harvesters to sell their catch to a processor. This has been 
particularly prevalent in the Snow Crab fishery and in recent years appears to have 
gotten out of hand. So much so that during the midway through the 2003 crab fishery, 
processors refused to buy crab to protest their own inability to control these rebates. 
The "Bonus" is extra money that is paid above the negotiated price by the processor, 
usually to the owner of the fishing enterprise, in order to convince that owner to sell 
his catch to the processor. The system operates in a manner that is similar to an 
auction. As mentioned earlier, the problem for processors was an inability to control 
these rebates. The problem for harvesters was bargaining power for these rebates was 
often dependent on the amount of crab they were permitted to catch. Harvesters with 
smaller Individual Quotas (IQ's) had less crab to offer and that often meant less rebate 
offered to them. Also, owners that may have received financial backing from 
processors for expansion of their enterprise may have signed trust agreements that 
forced them to sell to that buyer and reduced the bargaining power for rebates and 
bonuses. Still another group in the industry had problems with this system. 
Crewmembers often did not receive any portion of these rebates because they were 
usually paid directly to the owner of the enterprises at the end ofthe fishing season. 
Others did not receive a proportionate amount because they did not know how much 
bonus was paid. 
One benefit of an auction would be the levelling of the playing field for all 
participants. Under an auction, vessels in similar sectors with differing amounts of 
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quota would have equal footing within that sector. Processors would be able to 
compete equally for fish instead of competing through bonuses and privileges. The 
whole industry would be opened up and would hopefully create an atmosphere of 
honest competition among all players. Any differences in prices received would be 
explained through quality instead of quantity. This may enhance the importance of 
landing quality products by harvesters in the future. It may also help to create a sense 
of trust between all parties in the industry and smooth relations for future cooperation 
on problems in other areas of the fishery. 
Finally, one potential benefit could be an increase in the return on investment for 
those operating in the industry. Auctions operate on the premise that products of 
better quality should be more valuable and therefore should receive a higher price. 
While quality will be dealt with a little later in this chapter, it is plausible that quality 
will increase as buyers would want to pay more for better quality from fishermen. If 
buyers are getting better quality and paying more for it. they will want to ensure that 
the quality of the product is maintained. It makes no sense for a buyer to purchase a 
product of high quality and not take advantage of it to please their customers. If this 
holds true, the industry should see increased profitability. If auctions are successful in 
raising quality, there should be benefits for the industrY. 
4.2.2 What impact will auctions have on the quality of seafood landed and 
processed in this product? 
As mentioned earlier, the theory behind auctions lends itself to the idea that better 
quality products should receive higher bids. Can theo, stakeholders in the industry 
expect an increase in quality under an auction? First of all, in order for quality to 
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increase, there must be room to improve the quality and a method to do this. Looking 
at the fishing industry in this Province, the most obvious species with quality concerns 
is the Northern Shrimp. As discussed earlier, this is an industry that has received 
much criticism for the quality that is landed. However, how much impact can an 
auction have here? Most stakeholders agree that much of the problem with quality of 
Northern Shrimp lies in the time of the year it is harvested, and the size of boats that 
are harvesting it. An auction can do little to change these things in itself. While it 
may encourage boat owners to make improvements to their vessels that could improve 
quality where they can, it causes fishermen to fish at times when the natural forces do 
not permit. An auction may actually have a negative impact on this industry. Take 
for example if a storm forces fishermen to stop fishing for a week. After the storm 
ends, hundreds of boats leave at the same time and try to make a quick trip knowing 
that plants will probably be paying more for the first shrimp that gets landed. The 
problem arises when this enormous amount of shrimp arrives. Buyers know it will 
take them days to process all this shrimp so the product that comes in last will end 
waiting in cold storage and on trucks in the hot sun until it can be processed. All the 
time the quality is diminishing. The shrimp industry may be too unreliable for a 
auction to work well in increasing quality. 
Another important fishery where quality is a concern is in Groundfish. This includes 
such species as Cod, Greenland Halibut, Flounder, and Redfish among others. These 
fisheries are another area where quality has been a concern. This paper mentioned the 
problems of Cod quality back in the eighties, especially in the inshore fishery. Much 
of these problems with quality in the Groundfish fishery were a result of fishing 
methods and handling practises. In particular, Gillnets had a very bad impact on 
52 
quality due to the fact that fish often died in the net and the tight mesh made the fish 
susceptible to bruising. Once the fish died it immediately started to decompose. This 
decomposition is often more advanced in areas where the water is wanner. 
Meanwhile, handling practises, such as washing and icing were often not seen as 
being as important as they really were for quality. With the downfall of the 
Groundfish stocks, it is imperative that quality of these fisheries be improved in order 
to take advantage of the limited resources that are available. An auction may 
represent a way to do this. Today, Longlining fishing is seen as a method of 
improving the quality of fish especially when compared to Gillnets. Using a 
Longline, usually allows the fish to remain alive longer and reduces the amount of 
injury to the fish. This would represent an immediate improvement in quality. [ffish 
that are caught in this manner could be auctioned with fish that is Gillnetted, it should 
show which method has better quality as manifested by a better price. This should 
encourage other harvesters to catch their fish by the method that produces the best 
quality. In this situation the methods are available to the fishing sector to improve the 
quality of their products. 
Auctions will only achieve improvements in quality where there is a means to 
increase quality and where there is room for quality to improve. Under such 
circumstances where the means may not readily exist, an auction may fail to increase 
quality by itself. Therefore, it is necessary to identifY what is directly needed in each 
fishing sector to directly impact quality concerns. 
4.2.3. Is tbere enougb competition for an auction to operate effectively in this 
Province? 
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As discussed earlier, in areas where the quality of seafood is very high, such as in 
[celand, auctions may not significantly impact on quality. However, auctions did 
impact significantly on prices in that country. This was probably due to increased 
competition among buyers for product to process. This raises an important question. 
Are there enough buyers to support competition under in auction in this Province? 
Again in order to examine the benefits that may be accrued through competition under 
an auction it is important to look at the species of fish involved. Take for example 
Groundfish. [n 2002 there was 59880 Metric Tonnes (M.T.) landed in this Province 
with a landed value of $ 64,218,000. Also in 2002 there were 123 licensed Primary 
Groundfish plants operating in this Province that were capable of processing that 
Groundfish (www.gov.nf.ca/Fishaqllicensing/overview.stm May. 2004). These plants 
were in operation because provincial regulations state processing plants must be in 
operation the previous two years in order to obtain a licence. Certainly not all were 
processing the same species but it is safe to say there was plenty of competition in that 
sector. On the other hand was the shrimp industry, which landed 76462 M.T. of 
product but was processed in only II plants with a landed value of$143,820,000, 
certainly a smaller amount of competition for a much larger fishery. This was 
compounded by the fact that some buyers own multiple processing facilities. In 
between was the Snow Crab fishery, which landed 59422 M.T. of product to 36 
processing plants with a landed value of $235,803,000 
(www.gov.nf.ca/FishaqistatisticsI2002.stm May, 2004). These figures show where 
most of the competition lies in each sector. [f an auction were started today in these 
industries, the etTects of competition would most likely be observed in the crab 
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industry which appears to have high demand and a moderately high amount of 
competition. On the other hand there are few buyers in the shrimp industry, which is 
experiencing a much lower demand. The impacts of competition here may not be 
visible. Groundfish could benefit most from competition. It has many buyers and as 
mentioned earlier has the ability increase the quality in that industry. The effects on 
prices paid to fishermen could be substantial even though the crab industry appears to 
be operating in a buyers market (supply exceeds demand). It is important to note that 
the success of an auction is not measured by increases in prices. It is measured by the 
ability of the auction to adapt to changes in the market. However, if harvesters 
believe that a properly run auction will automatically result in higher prices, it may 
mean they would consider the auction a failure otherwise. There must not be any pre-
conceived notions about prices if an auction is to take place. 
This section began by asking if there is enough competition to operate an auction in 
this Province. Certainly in the Crab and Groundfish sectors there is plenty of 
competition. The Northern Shrimp industry has a very weak level of competition. 
Certainly, competition is a major factor in the ability of auctions to truly reflect 
market conditions. Therefore any auction system should be introduced in either the 
Snow Crab or Groundtish sector. 
4.2.4 Wbat cballenges face an auction system as a form of price determination 
in tbis Province? 
As with any change in the way business is done, some challenges may arise and some 
costs may be incurred with an auction system. Probably the biggest hindrance is the 
fact that some buyers and sellers may suffer under an auction. Some harvesters will 
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find it difficult to compete because of small, aging vessels. They are unable to equip 
their enterprises with the materials necessary to take advantage of prices offered for 
better quality. This could be particularly hard for shrimp fishermen. Ifprices paid for 
the highest quality shrimp are significantly higher than those paid for poorer quality, 
some fishing enterprises may find it difficult to survive, particularly those who do not 
have a Snow Crab licence. 
Likewise some buyers could be hurt under an auction. This could include companies 
that have difficulty running efficiently and are not able to bid for the better quality 
products. It could be said that these fishing enterprises and processors have no place 
in the industry if they cannot compete but one must also realize that these companies 
provide jobs in a employment challenged Province. The industry may be better off 
but is the Province? 
This coincides with situations that evolved in other countries where auctions have 
become a hub for activity, leaving voids in other areas. This is usually a problem in 
areas where display auctions are used but can also be a problem ifhail at sea auctions 
are used. Ports that are nearest the fishing grounds will probably be used more 
frequently under an auction which may lead companies to move to these areas in 
order to gain an advantage over other companies. As mentioned earlier, having 
auctions and processing facilities in close proximity helped to improve quality. It was 
easier and quicker to transport fish and thereby it would be fresher upon processing. 
There were logical reasons for the relocation of activity. The government could try to 
prevent this by allowing the buyer to decide where the catch will be landed. There 
would be no auction "site" as such but a central command that would receive bids 
56 
from buyers with conditions of sale. This may mean a certain price if the product is 
landed at a certain port. There would be no movement of resources from existing 
sites and landing would operate in much the same manner as before. However, if the 
government would like to see an accumulation of activity in certain areas of the 
Province, maybe an auction could help to achieve such a plan. It is important for 
those involved in the industry to decide what is most important and then determine the 
appropriate steps to achieve such results. 
Another concern is the processor-fmanced enterprises that now exist in the industry. 
The earlier discussion showed the amount of displeasure that was expressed by 
processors over this topic. This could be a significant obstacle to overcome especially 
if legal agreements exist between harvesters and processors. However, under an 
auction, a processor would be forced to bid on a catch that he may feel rightfully 
belongs to him since he helped to finance the catch. Therefore it may be difficult to 
persuade these processors to support the auction initially unless they are somehow 
relieved oftheir financial obligations to harvesters. Secondly, harvesters who have a 
long-standing relationship with one buyer who has supported them with financial help 
in the past may feel a sense of loyalty to that buyer and may not want to auction their 
catch to someone else. Finally, because there are a large number of buyers who have 
financed enterprises, they may decide not to bid too high on a catch that has been 
landed by a boat "belonging" to another processor. These reasons do not mean that an 
auction would not work, because there are some independent harvesters and 
processors out there. But, if everyone was independent, many of these circumstances 
could be dealt with and participants could put more confidence in the auction. 
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The potential for some harvesters to be hurt under an auction and the present 
financing situation between harvesters and processors have caused many to wonder if 
a minimum price should also be negotiated. For those harvesters who are tied to 
processors through loans, they may need some sort of safety net to support them in 
getting a fair price from a processor. On the other hand some harvesters may chose to 
negotiate a price among processors for themselves, judging by what happens on the 
auction sales. One problem with setting a minimum price is it will allow those 
harvesters who refuse to land good quality to continue to do so. If the purpose of the 
auction is to improve quality, it should be set up in such a way as to ensure that poor 
quality is not rewarded. Another reason that a minimum price may be unnecessary is 
because no one can be forced to buy a product that does not meet a minimum 
standard. If a harvester lands some fish that is spoiled, obviously no buyer would 
want to buy it. If it has no value the harvester should not be compensated. If a 
harvester lands a catch that has a low value because of its size, and an auction 
produces a price that is lower than a minimum price that was set, buyers should not be 
forced to pay a price that is higher than they feel the catch is worth and potentially, 
take a loss. Minimum prices do not benefit the industry as a whole and have no part 
in an auction. 
Another challenge that faces the industry under an auction is how to deal with 
determining Quality and handling disputes about such. If higher quality is worth 
more, there has to be a method of determining that level of quality. If one lot of fish 
receives more than another lot, there has to be an explanation for that difference. 
In the shrimp industry today, freshness is measured by only one method, scent. If a 
load of shrimp has the scent of ammonia, it can be turned down as being spoiled. 
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However, the test for this smell consists of the ability of a grader to detect that smell 
which is very subjective. In Iceland, a system has been developed that looks at 
multiple physical attributes in determining the quality of a product. This system is 
known as the Quality Index Method (QIM) (www.qim-eurofish.com. 2003). Under it 
various attributes of the fish are examined and given points based on quality. These 
points are then entered into a formula that gives a calibration of the quality ofthe fish. 
It is very objective and very reliable. These types of systems are needed here to prove 
to both buyer and seller the quality of the harvest. An objective quality grading 
system also helps to build a sense of openness in the industry. By having fish grading 
harvesters can be assured that the price they pay is purely based on the quality of the 
product they land and not on any other factor. . A grading system can identifY where 
the problems with quality lie and thereby help to advance the industry by making 
improvements in these areas. 
Any Grading System that is used must be implemented at the dockside when fish is 
landed. It is important to have an official grade administered as soon as possible in 
order to avoid disputes. Any changes that need to be made (0 the price that was 
agreed upon when the catch was hailed in can then be made. Once again, if the 
grading is done at the dockside, it adds to the sense of openness needed in the 
industry. Any disputes would then be handled by the auction company, which, would 
have the final say. Therefore it is important that the auction company be independent. 
Also both buyers and sellers should be made familiar with the methods used in 
grading the catch. 
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Finally the industry has to decide if it wants all catch to go through the auction. This 
issue raised a significant amount of opposing views between the union representing 
fish harvesters and the representatives of the fish processors. On one hand, the 
Fisheries, Food, And Allied Workers (FFA W) union were adamant that all fish must 
go through the auction while the Fisheries Association of Newfoundland and 
Labrador preferred to allow individuals to choose if they wanted to sell through the 
auction. First of all, this issue has become clouded by the amount of money invested 
into harvesting enterprises lately by processors. It is difficult to determine how these 
arrangements may affect the selling of fish through auctions. Processors are unlikely 
to support any arrangement that forces them to bid on load of fish that they helped to 
finance. This is a weak position for processors to talce. It is in the best interest for 
everyone in the industry for quality and prices to improve. If an auction can achieve 
this, processors stand to benefit substantially more than simply by trying to maintain a 
network of harvesters that sell to them. They have to remember that their profits 
come from the companies that buy their products on a world market. These products 
compete with quality products form around the world. If forcing everything through 
an auction can help to weed out bad quality, it should be done. But perhaps the 
greatest benefit of having all fish go through an auction is levelling of the playing 
field for all participants. Under an auction, smaller vessels with less quota would 
have equal footing with larger vessels with larger quotas. Processors would be able to 
compete equally for fish instead of competing through bonuses and privileges. The 
whole industry would be opened up and would hopefully create an atmosphere of 
honest competition among all players. Any differences in prices received would be 
explained through quality instead of quantity. 
5.0 Recommendations. 
The following recommendations are made concerning the establishment of an 
operating fish auction in the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador. 
5.1 Recommendations prior to an operating auction. 
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I. The provincial government, as well as representatives from the processing and 
fishing industries should set up a standing committee to gather information 
and to oversee price settlement mechanisms in this Province. The purpose 
behind this panel would be to foster cooperation and dialogue amongst 
participants in the fishing industry. The present situation consists of tense 
negotiations between representatives of FFA Wand processors. The members 
of such a panel would be made up of industry representatives that have had 
little influence in the past and can bring new ideas and new relationships to the 
table. 
2. The provincial government will immediately undertake a study to how a 
potential change in price detennination would impact communities that rely on 
the fishery in this Province. Auctions could mean a new landing schedule 
which. could negatively impact some communities that rely on boats landing 
in their ports. 
3. The provincial government should introduce programs and incentives for 
those persons interested in establishing a fish auction in this Province. 
4. Processors should study the issue of fish auctions and pricing to determine 
how auctions can be used to benefit their companies. 
5. Harvesters should also study the pricing system and fish auctions in order to 
determine how auctions can be used to benefit their enterprises. 
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6. A cooperative pilot project should be started that could evaluate the difference 
in value between high quality landings and those that are lower quality. This 
would involve intentionally harvesting high and low quality products. This is 
important in order to understand how much the fishing industry suffers from 
poor quality. This could provide empirical data rather than hearsay as to how 
poor quality impacts prices. This is very important to harvesters as they might 
see how improving quality could benefit their enterprises. 
7. Processors and harvesters should work together to devise a specific set of 
quality standards for the fishing industry. These standards would precisely 
define quality standards and the equivalent prices. This would avoid 
confusion as to why one harvester receives more than another for hislher 
catch. A system similar to the Qim-Eurofish method could be used as a 
model. 
8. The Province should immediately reinstate the Fisheries Loan Board in order 
to provide harvesters with a method of securing unbiased financing and free 
processors from debt. In lieu of a Loan Board, funds should be made available 
by either government, industry, banking institutions or a combination of the 
above, that would underwrite the costs for harvesters that are unable to 
provide high quality fish due to vessels that are not prepared for such 
activities, i.e. insulated fish holds, reconfigured fish holds to carry insulated 
boxes. 
9. A hail at sea auction should be instituted because it would be simple to use 
and would be cheaper to operate. 
10. The industry must identify the specific species that suffer from poor quality 
and identify means to improve that quality. 
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II. All fish should go through the auction. This will provide a transparency to the 
industry, which it is lacking now. Until changes can be made to how fishing 
enterprise financing now occurs, all species should go through an auction. 
12. A minimum price should not be used for any species where an auction is 
operating. 
13. The auction should be mandatory by sector. For example, all crab caught in 
the thirty-five to sixty-five foot class of vessels should go through an auction. 
S.2 Recommendations for an operating auction 
14. The auction should be run by an independent company without ties to the 
harvesting or processing sectors. 
15.ln the event that an auction was operating, the provincial government should 
establish a market evaluation position within the Department of Fisheries and 
Aquaculture that would track pricing in the industry to determine if a fish 
auction is providing a benefit to the industry. This should be the responsibility 
of the government to show impartiality. 
16. Quality reports should be issued on a particular schedule in order to inform 
participants in the industry as to how it is reacting to the auction system. 
17. In lieu of operating fish auction, processors should offer small incentives to 
vessels whose harvest represents a high quality product. This type of program 
would allow fishers to see the benefits of landing a high quality product and 
may ease the introduction of an auction. 
18. The provincial government should encourage other smaller buyers to explore 
the options that a fish auction might present to them. Perhaps a small buyer 
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The purpose of this paper was to explore the potential ability of operating a fish 
auction in this Province as an alternative method of price detennination in the fishery, 
and to provide recommendations based on this information. The analysis of the 
information gathered shows that while there may be some potential drawbacks and 
hannful effects to operating an auction, there arc many reasons to support such an 
endeavour. This research attempted to uncover the potential benefits operating a fish 
auction in this Province. The research shows several potential benefits for the fishing 
industry. First of all it should create a more transparent method of price 
determination in the fishing industry. This situation could lead to less disruptions in 
the fishing industry due to price disputes. Another potential benefit could be 
increased prices and better quality. An auction could provide a means of improving 
quality if vessels that land better quality are paid for doing such. As other harvesters 
see the financial benefits of improving quality, they will in tum take steps to improve 
the quality of their catch. While this may be attainable through other systems such as 
incentives, auctions provide the transparency that other systems, such as price 
incentives, lack. 
This leads to the second question this paper posed. How will auctions impact quality? 
An auction in itself cannot change the quality of the fish being landed. It can 
facilitate change by providing evidence that higher quality is worth more to the 
buyers. Quality can only be improved where there is room to improve and where this 
is a means to improve poor quality. An auction should highlight the species in the 
Newfoundland and Labrador fishery that suffer the most from poor quality. It is then 
up to harvesters and buyers to fmd a means to improve this quality. 
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The third question that was posed tries to identify if there is enough competition to 
run an auction here. The answer here depends on the species. Certainly Groundfish 
and Snow Crab could provide plenty of competition while Northern Shrimp may not 
be competitive enough. 
Finally, what are the challenges, which would be encountered in establishing an 
auction in this Province? First of all, there is potential for a change in the way 
business is done in this industry under an auction. This change will affect both buyers 
and sellers. There is potential for some harvesters and processors to find it very 
difficult to compete under an auction. This could lead to some potential loss of jobs 
for those fish enterprises that do not adapt to a changing market. The same is also 
true for some processors. Another problem that has to be examined is the fmancing 
arrangements between processors and harvesters. This is a very serious challenge and 
should be eliminated before an auction is in place as financial agreements may 
undennine the operation of an auction. The industry must also decide if a minimum 
price would still be set under an auction. While this may protect some harvesters who 
are unable to adapt to an auction, it does not serve to benefit the industry as it serves 
to potentially reward poor quality. The industry also has to come up with a grading 
system that would work under an auction. This is necessary to aid in the transparency 
of an auction. Harvesters need to be provided with empirical evidence that shows 
why one catch is of better quality than another. 
Finally, will all catch go through an auction? The research from Iceland shows that it 
may not be necessary for all catch to go through an auction. The results from that 
country show that auctions work well without forcing all sales to go through an 
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auction. However~ this is not recommended for this Province. There are two reasons 
for this. First of all, it will improve the transparency of the auction. Secondly, it will 
aid in showing the best means for improving quality as harvesters have different 
methods of catching and storing their catch. Evidence should be gathered that will 
show the best methods for providing good quality. However, a voluntary auction 
may decrease the amount of transparency in the industry. If any harvester or 
processor is not in favour of an auction, it may be possible to manipulate prices that 
are outside the auction. One issue that keeps rising in this research is transparency, 
and it the industry wants to progress, it should take the steps that will provide the 
most transparency. However, the government should not force all species to go 
through an auction immediately. 
If an auction is to be instituted, there are several issues that the government must keep 
in mind. This study found that openness was a major benefit to the use of an auction, 
therefore, the government must make sure this is a top priority in a functioning 
auction. One way to do this is to have the auction operated by an independent 
company. Having operators that have close ties to particular segments of the industry, 
such as harvesting or processing weakens the ability ofthe auction to operate in an 
open manner. Any disagreements in price may be seen as being influenced by other 
factors such as collusion rather than quality and market conditions. Another issue 
here deals with processor financing of harvesting enterprises. It is unclear if such an 
issue will have any effect on an auction but both sides of the issue have concerns. 
Various agreements between processors and harvesters may come into play under an 
auction. A voluntary auction may allow the existence of such agreements to continue 
but is difficult to judge how it will impact participants in the industry. One thing that 
can be stated is that many harvesters do not like these agreements now and would 
prefer a system that allowed them to sell to whomever they chose. A voluntary 
auction may prevent this from happening. 
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The government must also decide which species will present the best opportunity for 
an auction to succeed as a form of price detennination. If an auction does not 
succeed, there are few alternatives for other methods of price determination. 
Therefore the government must choose a species that will show the most potential to 
work. This will probably be either Snow Crab or a Groundfish species such as Turbot 
from the Northeast Coast of Newfoundland and Labrador or Cod from the South 
Coast of Newfoundland. Both offer plenty of competition as well as a means to 
improve quality, especially Groundfish species. These fisheries represent a 
significant portion of the fishery in this Province and could go a long way in proving 
the ability of an auction to work. 
One final issue that came up during this research was the issue of minimum price 
setting under an auction. Would a minimum price be necessary under an auction? 
The problem with a minimum price under an auction system is that it has the potential 
to undermine the ability of an auction to encourage participants to increase quality. A 
minimum price may simply provide an outlet for poor quality. While it may allow 
those that are incapable of producing high quality to remain in the industry, it may 
cause the industry to continue to produce inconsistent quality on the world market. 
However, under a voluntary auction, minimum prices may still be set, especially if 
processor financing still exists. This will ensure that harvesters who have agreed to 
sell product to processors in exchange for processor fmancing will receive a fair price. 
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However, this calls for a major change in the way business is done in the fishing 
industry today. Such changes must be well thought out so as to avoid as many 
problems in the future. This is not a system that should be rushed. Also, all parties 
must be willing to cooperate, should problems arise. This is not something that 
should be abandoned if difficulties arise. Based on the infonnation given, the 
provincial government should begin plans, in cooperation with industry 
representatives, to inaugurate a fish auction sometime in the near future. 
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